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CONGRESSIONAL ENACTMENT OF UNIFORM
JUDICIAL NOTICE ACT

Lawrence E. Hartwig*

T

HE National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Laws
approved in 1936 the Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law
Act,1 which has since been adopted by fourteen states.2 This act was
drafted to make uniform a legislative movement of the past twelve
years proposing to change two rules of the common law. One is the
rule that a state court will not notice the law of sister states in the

*

Assistant Professor of Law, University of Oregon; A.B., J.D., University of
Michigan.-Ed.
1
"Section 1. (Judicial Notice.) Every court of this state shall take judicial
notice of the common law and statutes of every state, territory and other jurisdiction
of the United States.
"Section 2. (Information of the Court.) The court may inform itself of such
laws in such manner as it may deem proper, and the court may call upon counsel to
aid it in obtaining such information.
"Section 3. (Ruling Reviewable.) The determination of such laws shall be
made by the court and not by the jury, and shall be reviewable.
"Section 4. (Evidence as to Laws of Other Jurisdictions.) Any party may
also present to the trial court any admissible evidence of such laws, but, to enable a
party to offer evidence of the law in another jurisdiction or to ask that judicial notice
be taken thereof, reasonable notice shall be given to the adverse parties either in the
pleadings or otherwise.
"Section 5. (Foreign Country.) The law of a jurisdiction other than those
referred to in Section l shall be an issue for the court, but shall not be subject to the
foregoing provisions concerning judicial notice.
"Section 6. (Interpretation.) This act shall be so interpreted and construed
as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which
enact it.
"Section 7. (Short title.) This act may be cited as the Uniform Judicial
Notice of Foreign Law Act.
"Section 8. (Repeal.) All acts or parts of acts inconsistent with the provisions of this act, are hereby repealed.
Section 9. (Time of Taking Effect.) This act shall take effect - - - - "
9 UNIFORM LAws ANNOTATED (Supp. 1941), pp. 107-109.
2
Ill. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, Supp. 1940), c. 51, §§ 48g-48n; Ind. Stat. Ann.
(Burns, Supp. 1941), §§ 2-4801 to 2-4807; Me. Laws (1939), c. 75; Md. Code
Ann. (1939), art. 35, §§ 56-62; Minn. Stat. (Mason, Supp. 1940), §§ 9852-1 to
·9852-7; Mont. Rev. Code (Supp. 1939), §§ 10532.1 to 10532.7; N. J. Laws (1941),
c. 81, Rev. Stat.§ 2:98-28; N. D. Laws (1937), c. 196; Ohio Code (Baldwin, Supp.
1940), §§ 12102-31 to 12102-37 [judicial notice of statutes only; see 6 OHio L. J.
37 (1939)]; Ore. Comp. Laws (1940), §§ 2-503 to 2-509; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon,
Supp. 1940), §§ 291-297 [see 14 TEMP. L. Q. 267 at 271 (1940)]; R. I. Laws
(1940), c. 939; S. D. Code (1939), § 36.0702; Wyo. Sess. Laws (1941), c. 78.
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United States; 8 and the other is the rule that the determination of
such law shall be made by the jury and not by the judge.4 Accordingly,
the Uniform Act provides (1) that state courts shall take judicial
notice of the common law and statutes of every state, territory, and
other jurisdiction of the United States,5 and ( 2) that laws of sister
states and foreign countries shall be determined by the judge.0 These
two provisions are complementary to each other, since a corollary of
the requirement of judicial notice is the requirement that sister state
law shall be decided by the judge and not by the jury.
In drafting the Uniform Act the commissioners were motivated
not only by the desire for uniformity, but also by the need for a statute
that would accomplish the desired reforms.7 Twenty-two states have
already adopted judicial notice statutes which vary materially in their
phrasing and which have, with various degrees of success, achieved their
purpose. 8 In the opinion of the commissioners, this experience has
demonstrated the need for more effective legislation. The Uniform
Act represents an attempt to meet this need. It was drafted in the
light of previous experience with state judicial notice statutes and was
intended as a model for state legislation in this field.
If the necessity for an effective, uniform statute exists ( and the
Commissioners on Uniform Laws feel that it does), it would seem that
the reforms contemplated could better be accomplished by Congressional action than by state action. It would be easier to secure adoption
by one federal legislature than by many state legislatures, and even
though all of the states did adopt the act without amendment, different
interpretations probably would be made by the courts in some. Complete uniformity is only to be achieved through enactment of a federal
law, which becomes effective immediately in every state and which is
subject to one rule of construction. These reasons apparently establish
8

9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed.,§ 2573 (1940).
9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., § 2558 (1940); 30 M1cH. L. REV. 747 at
748-749 (1932).
5
Sec. 1, quoted note 1, supra.
6
Secs. 3 and 5, quoted note 1, supra.
7 This is one of the objectives of the uniform law movement. See: Paper by
Freund in 22 IND. STATE BAR AssN. PRoc. 153 at 160-161 (1918); 16 ILL. L. REv.
227 at 229-230 (1921); Lapp, "Uniform State Legislation," 4 AM. PoL. Sci. REV.
576 at 580 (1910).
8
30 M1cH. L. REv. 747 at 761-765 (1932); 37 YALE L. J. 813 (1928);
10 BOST. UN1v. L. REV. 417 (1930); 46 HARV. L. REv. 1019 (1933). To the
fifteen statutes enumerated in these notes should be added the statutes cited in note
2, supra.
4
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a prima facie case for Congressional rather than state action, provided
that Congress possesses the requisite constitutional power.9
It is proposed to discuss here the political and constitutional aspects
of this possible solution of the problem.

I
THE UNIFORM JUDICIAL NOTICE OF FOREIGN LAW

AcT

A. Need for Changing Common Law
Section I of the Uniform Act provides that state courts "shall take
judicial notice of the common law and statutes of every state, territory, and other jurisdiction of the United States." This provision
abolishes the so-called common-law rule that state courts will not take
judicial notice of the law of sister jurisdictions of the United States.10
It imposes a duty to take notice of that law, which is like the duty to
notice the domestic law.
The so-called common-law rule was derived from the English rule
that English courts will not take judicial notice of the law of foreign
countries. This latter rule was, and still is, supported by considerations
not present today with respect to jurisdictions within the United
States.11 The relative inaccessibility of foreign law reports and statutes,
and the necessity for their translation and interpretation by persons
familiar with the foreign system, which frequently differed from the
common law, were the grounds upon which the English courts based
their refusal to take judicial notice of foreign law and required instead
that it be proved as a fact. 12 For reasons of expediency they rejected
9

Although this article will treat only of the Uniform Judicial Notice Act: the
thesis advanced will have broad implications. Conceivably Congress may have the
power to adopt other uniform acts such as Uniform Acknowledgements Act; Uniform
Foreign Depositions Act; Uniform Proof of Statutes Act; Uniform Wills Act, Foreign
Probated; and Uniform Act to Secure Attendance of Witnesses from Without a State in
Criminal Proceedings. See texts in 9 UNIFORM LAws ANNOTATED (1932).
10
See note 3, supra.
11
3 BEALE, CoNFLICT OF LAws, § 621.3 (1935); Explanatory Note, 9 UNIFORM LAws ANNOTATED (Supp. 1941), p. 106. In Hammond Motor Co. v. Warren,
u3 Kan. 44 at 46, 213 P. 810 (1923), the court said: "Nor would it be indiscreet to
add that the old rule that a court cannot consider and apply the general statutes of
another state unless they are specially pleaded and formally proved, even to prevent a
miscarriage of justice, is an anachronism which comes down from the times when
statutes of other states were not readily accessible, and the judiciary will not wait much
longer for legislative assistance to get rid of it altogether."
12 9 UNIFORM LAws ANNOTATED (Supp. 1941), p. 106; 13 HALSBURY, LAws
OF ENGLAND, 2d ed., §§ 685-689 (1934).
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a rule which would burden them with a difficult task of investigation.13
However, none of these considerations exists today as between jurisdictions within the United States, whatever the situation may have been
a hundred years ago. There is only one official language; a vast
majority of the states have the same legal system; and the reports and
statutes of the various states are widely circulated. Judges can familiarize themselves with the law of other states as easily as they can
determine their own law. 14 It is submitted, therefore, that the refusal
to take judicial notice is no longer justified by considerations of convemence.
Aside from the fact that the common-law practice is an anachronism,
13
The development of the doctrine of judicial notice was concerned with de.fining matters which were so notorious that the court could notice and act upon them
without formal proof. Although at .first the doctrine apparently was extended primarily
to facts notorious to all men, it later was applied to facts known to educated men or
easily ascertainable by the judges. Thus, the English courts began to notice the contents of statutes in 1537 and 1553, although as a matter of fact they probably had no
actual knowledge of them. 9 HoLoswoRTH,H1sTORYoFENGLISHLAw 135-136 (1926).
But where the foreign law was pertinent to the decision of a case the necessity for expert testimony was recognized, since the judges neither had actual knowledge of the
law nor were they equipped to ascertain it without the assistance of experts. In Buckley
v. Rice Thomas, l Plowden 120 at 124-125, 75 Eng. Rep. 186 (1554), the court
said per Saunders, J.: "I grant that if matters arise in our law which concern other
sciences or faculties, we commonly apply for the aid of that science or faculty which
it concerns. • •. And therefore in 7 H. 6 in a case that came before the Judges,
which was determinable in our law, and also touched upon the civil law, they were well
content to hear Huls who was a batchelor of both laws, argue and discourse upon logic,
and upon the difference between compulsione praecisa et causatifla, as men that were
not above being instructed and made wiser by him." See 5 HoLDSWORTH, HISTORY
OF ENGLISH LAw 419-420 (1926). See also: Sussex Peerage Case, II Cl. & Fin. 85, 8
Eng. Rep. 1034 (1844).
14
In Gorman v. St. Louis Merchants' Bridge Terminal Ry., 325 Mo. 326 at
332-333, 28 S. W. (2d) 1023 (1930), the court said per Ragland, J.: "In support of
its .first assignment appellant has cited Illinois cases as exemplifying the principles of
law which it insists are controlling with respect thereto, the cause of action having arisen
in the State of Illinois. The law as so interpreted would be controlling if we were
cognizant of it. It was neither pleaded nor proven and we cannot take judicial notice
of it. This last seems an absurd thing to say when it is considered that the official
reports of the courts of last resort of our sister state are lying here before us and that
we frequently cite cases reported in them as persuasive authority in support of our own
rulings. But until the Legislature sees .fit to fully release us from this archaic rule ••• we
are supposed to abide by it."
The effect of the Uniform Act would be to shift the duty of ascertaining the
foreign law from counsel to the court, but the duty imposed would not unduly hinder
the judge. The act specifically provides that he may inform himself as to the law in
such manner as he pleases, and he may ask the assistance of counsel ( § 2) • The obligation
which rests upon the judge to ascertain the domestic law is similar in nature and is
not considered to be onerous. It is unlikely, therefore, that the provisions for judicial
notice can be objected to on this score. See 20 CoL. L. REv. 476 at 477-478 (1920).
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there are affirmative reasons for suggesting that the courts should
notice sister state law. At present it must be proved as a fact when
under conflicts rules it determines the rights of the litigants.1~ If a
party relying upon the foreign law fails to prove it, however, the courts
consider the grant of a nonsuit or a directed verdict in favor of the
opposing party too harsh.16 Here most courts make a presumption as
to the foreign law.17 In many instances the presumption is reasonable
and the result is the same as though the court judicially noticed the
applicable law, but in other cases the presumption has no reasonable
basis and its adoption in effect abrogates the rules of conflict of laws.
This anomalous and unequal operation would be avoided if the courts
were obligated to take judicial notice and thus avoid the use of presumptions.
No attempt will be made here to examine and criticize extensively
the presumptions which are employed: that has been done adequately
by others.18 It will be sufficient for present purposes to consider these
presumptions generally. Three different rules have been formulated.
(I) Some courts presume that the law of the sister state is similar to
the common law of the forum as it existed prior to statutory modifications.19 (2) Others presume that the law of the sister state is the same
as the law of the forum (including statutes of the forum). 20 (3) Other
courts make a combination of the first two: as to those states which were
formed from territory formerly under English control the presumption
is that the law there is the common law unchanged by statute; as to
the other states no presumption is made, and the law of the forum is
applied.21
·
15
3 BEALE, CoNFLICT OF LA.ws, § 621.5 (1935); 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d
ed.,§ 2558 (1940).
16 3 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS,§ 622A.1 (1935).
11
3 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 623.1 (1935); 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d
ed.,§ 2536 (1940); 67 L. R. A. 33 at 38-61 (1905); 113 AM. ST. REP. 868 at 875881 (1907).
18
3 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAws, § 623.1 (1935); Kales, "Presumption of the
Foreign Law," 19 HARV. L. REV. 401 (1906); von Moschzeisker, "Presumptions as
to Foreign Law," II MINN. L. REv. I (1926); 30 MicH. L. REv. 747 at 755-761
(1932); 33 HARV. L. REv. 315 (1919); 20 CoL. L. REv. 476 (1920).
19 Cases collected in 30 MICH. L. REV. 747 at 755-757, note 25 (1932). See
also: 3 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LA.ws, § 623.1 (1935); 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed.,
§ 2536 (1940); Kales, "Presumption of the Foreign Law," 19 HARV. L. REv.
401 (1906).
2
°Cases collected in 30 MICH. L. REV. 747 at 758-759, note 30 (1932). See
also other authorities cited in note 19, supra.
21 Cases collected in 30 MICH. L. REV. 747 at 760, note 35 (1932). See also:
3 BEALE, CoNFLICT OF LA.ws, § 623.1 (1935); 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed.,
§ 2536,note 2 (1940).
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All three rules, and especially the third, are open to criticism. It
may be said with respect to the first that in the ordinary case involving
jurisdictions which have the common law it is proper to presume that
the law of the sister state is similar to the common law. Yet so much
of the common law has been altered by statute that to presume its
existence in all cases runs counter to reasonable probability. Similarly,
the second view is undesirable since there is no basis for the presumption that the statutes of the forum are similar to the law of the sister
state. The third view lacks the simplicity of the first two without more
nearly approaching the actual facts. To the extent that it makes no
presumption at all as to the foreign law, and requires application of
local law, it completely violates conflicts principles. The desirable
remedy seems obvious: a judicial notice statute which eliminates presumptions entirely and requires the court actually to determine the law
of the sister state.
A desirable consequence of the requirement of judicial notice is that
the foreign law shall be found by the judge and not by the jury. Accordingly, the Uniform Act abrogates the rule which exists in some
states that sister state law is a matter of "fact" determinable by the
jury/2 by providing that the judge shall make this determination.23
The rule which leaves this question to the jury has been severely criticized; it has never been defended as a matter of policy or convenience.H
Whether sister state law is "fact" or "law," it would seem that the
judge should decide what it is since he is better qualified to determine
that question than the jury.
B, Need for Uniformity
Admittedly there is less need for uniform practice among the states
with respect to a procedural matter such as judicial notice than there is
for uniformity of substantive laws regulating commercial and other
matters. 25 Nevertheless, uniform procedure is desirable because of the
increasing amount of litigation involving interstate transactions and
transactions which occur outside the forum. 26 The Commissioners on
22

See note 4, supra.
Section 3, quoted note 1, supra.
2
~ 9 W1GMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., § 2558 (1940); 31 HARV. L. REv. 896
(1918); 20 HARV. L. REv. 575 (1907).
25
Hemphill, "The Uniform Law Craze," 18 LAWY. & BANKER 170 (1925),
reprinted 60 AM. L. REV. 312 (1926); Ailshie, "Limits of Uniformity in State
Laws," 13 A.B.A.J. 633 at 635 (1927); Young, "Uniform State Laws," 19 VERMONT
BAR ASSN, PROC. 137 (1926).
26 Walsh, "Uniform Laws and Court Procedure," 3 LAWY. & BANKER 165 at
168-169 (1910); Shelton, "Fixed Interstate Judicial Relations," 14 MINN. STATE
BAR ASSN. PRoc. 23 at 37-38 (1914).
28

180

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 40

Uniform Laws have recognized this by proposing a number of laws
which are primarily procedural in nature. 21 Furthermore, uniformity is
particularly desirable in the judicial notice of sister state law since the
mode of ascertaining that law is inseparably connected with the extrastate enforcement of causes of action. We have seen that the use of
presumptions sometimes results in the application of the "wrong'' law
or the "wrong'' principles of law,28 and to the extent that the rules of
conflict of laws are.based upon sound policy this method of determining the applicable rule by presumption must be deprecated. The adoption of the Uniform Act will not only, by abolishing presumptions,
facilitate the application of conflicts principles, but it will also render
their application more uniform and certain.
Apart from the desirability of a uniform statute, necessity does exist
for an adequate statute. Some of the state judicial notice statutes have
been criticized on the ground that they are too explicit, others because
they are too general.29 It may be concluded that the reforms attempted
in these states have not been wholly successful.

C. Provisions of the Act
It has already been observed that the Uniform Act has a twofold
purpose.80 It provides ( r) that state courts shall take judicial notice of
the common law and statutes of every state, territory, and other jurisdiction of the United States; and ( 2) that such laws shall be determined
by the court.31 These purposes are effectuate_d by sections r and 3,
which are as follows:
"Section r. Every court of this state shall take judicial notice
of the common law and statutes of every state, territory, and other
jurisdiction of the United States."
27
Uniform Acknowledgments Act; Uniform Acknowledgments Act, Foreign;
Uniform Act to Secure Attendance of Witnesses; Uniform Official Reports as Evidence
Act; Uniform Act for Extradition of Persons of Unsound Mind; Uniform Foreign
Depositions Act; Uniform Proof of Statutes Act; Uniform Wills Act, Foreign Executed;
Uniform Wills Act, Foreign Probated.
28
See p. I 79, supra.
29
30 M1cH. L. REv. 747 at 761-765 (1932); 46 HARV. L. REv. 1019 at 1020
(1933); 37 YALE L. J. 813 (1928); 24 CAL. L. REv. 3II at 312 (1936); 10 BosT.
UN1v. L. REV. 417 (1930); 42 HARV. L. REv. 130 (1928); 14 ST. Louis L. REV.
440 (1929).
80
See pp. 174-175, supra.
81 Sec. 5 of the Uniform Act provides that the law of foreign countries shall be
an issue for the determination of the court, but that such law shall not be subject to the
provisions of the act concerning judicial notice. In the absence of a treaty, Congress
probably could not enact this section and for this reason the act will be discussed as
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"Section 3. The determination of such laws shall be made
by the court and not by the jury, and shall be reviewable."
The duty imposed upon the court by section r to take judicial
notice of the foreign law does not necessarily imply, if the section stood
alone, that the court exclusively shall determine such law in all cases.82
The purpose of this section is to expedite proof; but in case the "evidence" is conflicting, the foreign law noticed by the judge could be
disputed by evidence of the opposing party.118 This is the usual practice
in judicial notice cases, which is recognized by section 4 of the Uniform
Act.H In this situation, then, the judge would not be precluded by
the terms of section r from submitting the evidence to the jury, who
could negative the judge's ruling. 35 To avoid this possibility the framers of the Uniform Act specifically provided in section 3 that it is the
function of the court in all instances to determine the foreign law.86
The remaining sections designate the procedure to be followed by
the courts in carrying out the foregoing provisions. They are merely
explanatory, describing in greater detail the intention which is more
though § 5 were omitted. Since the cases involving the law of a foreign country are
comparatively few, the omission of § 5 will not seriously impair the usefulness of the
statute. Moreover, once the act becomes effective the practice established of having the
judge decide the law of other states may well be extended by the courts, upon their own
initiative, to foreign law. Should the United States negotiate treaties on the subject
with foreign countries, Congress probably would have the power to prescribe how the
law of those countries shall be determined by the state courts. See 23 ILL. L. REV.
732 at 736 (1929).
82
9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., § 2567 (1940).
83
Id., THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 308 (1898): "Taking
judicial notice does not import that the matter is indisputable. It is not necessarily
anything more than a prima f acie recognition, leaving the matter still open to controversy."
H Sec. 4 provides, "Any party may also present to the trial court any admissible
evidence of such laws/' presumably for the purpose of rebutting the evidence of the
opposing party and to show the court what the rule of law is which should be noticed.
35
Some courts might hold that a statutory duty to take judicial notice of the law
of another state also requires the court to decide the law without submitting the issue
to the jury. See Hale v. New Jersey Steam Navigation Co., 15 Conn. 539 at 549
(1843); Lockwood v. Crawford, 18 Conn. 361 at 370 (1847); Thomson-Houston
Elec. Co. v. Palmer, 52 Minn. 174 at 177, 53 N. W. II37 (1893). But, as pointed
out above, the duty to take judicial notice does not also make the judge's determination exclusive, in the absence of a statutory provision therefor. The rulings in these
cases are referable rather to the doctrine that, at common law, the foreign law should
be evidenced to the court and not to the jury. See 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §
2567, notes 3, 4, and 5 (1940).
86
Should the judge's determination be contrary to the weight of the evidence,
his decision would be reviewable. See § 3, quoted supra, note 1.
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generally expressed in sections I and 3.87 They were inserted in the
act out of an abundance of caution as a guide to the courts in interpreting
the provisions set out above.88

II
A

FEDERAL

AcT

A. Desirability of Congressional Enactment

If there is need for a statute such as the Uniform Judicial Notice
Act, Congressional enactment would seem to be preferable to state
enactment because it is easier to overcome the inertia of one legislative
body than of :fifty-three.89 Only eight 40 of the sixty-eight uniform laws
which have been proposed have been adopted by a majority of the
87
Thus, § 2 provides: "The court may inform itself of such laws in such manner
as it may deem proper, and the court may call upon counsel to aid it in obtaining such
information." This section visualizes the possibility that the court may not actually
know the law of another jurisdiction. It states in broadest terms that the court may
investigate the law for itself or may ask counsel to assist in the investigation. Even
though § 2 were not in the act, § I might have been interpreted to permit the court
to call upon counsel for assistance. This practice exists with respect to the ascertainment
of domestic law, whicl:i the court judicially notices, and there would seem to be no
reason why the practice should not be observed in ascertaining the foreign law. It is
generally recognized in judicial notice cases of all kinds that the judge may investigate the facts for himself or may ask the help of counsel. See THAYER, A PRELIMINARY
TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 280, note 2 (1898). This practice can reasonably be read
into the judicial notice requirement of § 1, so that § 2 is hardly needed.
Sec. 4, quoted supra, note 1, provides that the party who wishes to invoke the
law of another jurisdiction must give adequate notice to adverse parties of his intention.
Fairness requires that opponents be notified so they can prepare to introduce countervailing evidence. In some states where persons relying upon the foreign law must plead
it, notice is given by the pleadings, but in those states where the law need not be
pleaded notice should otherwise be given. Sec. 4 was inserted to remove any doubt
about this matter. Like § 2, however, it may be regarded as surplusage since § 1 might
have been construed as imposing a duty to give reasonable notice.
The provision of § 3 that the determination of the foreign law shall be reviewable merely describes the procedural consequence of requiring the judge to decide the
issue and not the jury. The decision of the judge would be reviewable in the absence
of this provision, so this clause adds little to§ 3. See 9 W1GMORE, EvIDENcE, 3d ed., §
2573 at p. 561 (1940).
88
Commissioners' Explanatory Note, 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED (Supp. 1941),
pp. 107-108.
89
The uniform laws are proposed for adoption by the forty-eight states and by
Alaska, Hawaii, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and the Philippine Islands•
.ro Number of adoptions: Uniform Act to Secure Attendance of Witnesses, 35;
Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, 31; Uniform Sales Act, 37; Uniform Warehouse
Receipts Act, 49; Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act, 53; Uniform Bills of Lading
Act, 28; Uniform Narcotic Drug Act, 42; Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act, 33.
See annotations to the various acts in Uniform Laws Annotated.
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jurisdictions, and only one has been accepted by all.41 Complete uniformity has not been realized in most cases, and there is no reason to
believe that the Uniform Judicial Notice Act will fare any better in
this respect than the others.42
Moreover, it will be enacted in some states with amendments of
various kinds, if past experience is an accurate basis for prediction; and
even those provisions which are adopted without amendment will be
susceptible to diverse interpretations by the courts.48 For these reasons,
real uniformity can only be accomplished by a federal statute which will
become immediately the law in all the states and territories, and which
will be subject to one construction.
Two practical objections might be made to enactment by Congress,
neither of which is conclusive when properly considered: (I) A federal
judicial notice statute would constitute an unwarranted encroachment
upon states' rights; and (2) such a statute would unduly burden the
federal courts with litigation that might better be decided by the state
courts. These objections will be considered separately.
The states' rights contention has merit in those instances where differences in local conditions require diversity of laws among the states
rather than uniformity.44 Indeed, those differences in conditions which
are reflected in dissimilar state policies may partially explain why some
of the uniform laws, particularly the "social" measures, have not been
41

Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act.
The uniform acts which have been most successful, such as the Negotiable Instruments Act, Warehouse Receipts Act, Bills of Lading Act, and Sales Act, have dealt
with strictly "legal" problems; those which have been least successful have been "social"
measures, such as the Marriage and Marriage License Act; Child Labor Act; Workmen's Compensation Act. Young, "Address of President," 51 A.B.A. REP. 651 at 657
( l 926). It would seem, too, that the most successful acts have dealt with commercial
matters where the need for uniformity is greatest. Although the Judicial Notice of
Foreign Law Act deals with a "legal" matter as distinguished from a "social" matter,
it is not likely to be so successful as the commercial statutes mentioned above, since the
need for uniform procedure probably is not so great as the desire for uniform substantive
laws respecting commerce.
48
Shelton, "An American Common Law in the Making-the Habit of Thinking
Uniformity," 30 LAW NoTES 50 at 53 (1926); Crook, "Uniform State Laws," 4
TEX. L. REv. 316 at 325-326 (1926); 43 WASH. L. REP. 67 (1915); Barratt, "The
Tendency to Unifi.cation of Law in the United States," 5 J. CoMP. LEG. & INT. L. 3d
ser., 227 at 230-231 (1923).
44
Hemphill, "The Uniform Law Craze," 18 LAWY. & BANKER 170 (1925),
reprinted 60 AM. L. REV. 312 (1926); Ailshie, "Limits of Uniformity in State Laws,"
13 A.B.A.J. 633 at 635 (1927); Moore, "The Passion for Uniformity," 62 UNiv.
PA. L. REv. 525 at 539 (1914); Kenner, "The Function of Uniform State Laws,"
I IND. L. J. 127 at 129 (1926); Lapp, "Uniform State Legislation," 4 AM. PoL. Sci.
REV. 576 at 580 (1910).
42
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widely adopted.45 In so far as those laws deal with subjects which
require diverse regulation by the states, enactment by Congress would
be unwise even though Congress had the power.40 It is submitted,
however, that the subject matter of a statute such as the Uniform
Judicial Notice Act is adapted to uniform treatment and does not affect
local policy. It cannot be said that there are inherent differences in the
court procedure of the various states which necessitate differing practices with respect to proof of sister state law. Although state procedure
has been regarded traditionally as local in nature, the enforcement of
sister state laws involves relationships between states and should be
considered as of federal concern. In 1790 and r8or, Congress adopted
procedural laws regulating the manner of proving in state courts the
statutes and the judicial and nonjudicial records of other states,47 yet
no objection has been made to that legislation on the ground that it
intruded upon fields of local concern. Nor should the argument prevail
against a judicial notice statute which establishes the method of ascertaining sister state law.
Assuming that judicial notice is suited to uniform legislation, a
federal statute on the subject might nevertheless be unwise if it :flooded
the federal courts with litigation which might better be determined by
the state courts. In that event the advantage of a unified law might be
outweighed by the disadvantage of an overworked federal judiciary.48
If, for example, the federal judicial notice statute were construed as
giving litigants the right of appeal to the United States Supreme Court
from the state supreme court whenever it claimed that the state court
erroneously decided the law of another state, serious objections might
be made to the act.49 To remove any question about this, the statute
45
Young, "Address of President," 51 A.B.A. REP. 651 at 657-658 (1926);
Kenner, "The Function of Uniform State Laws," l IND. L. J. 127 at 134 (1926).
46
MacChesney, "Uniform State Laws," 48 CHICAGO LEGAL NEWS 353 at 356
(1916).
47
Rev. Stat. (1878), §§ 905, 906, 28 U. S. C. (1934), §§ 687, 688.
48
Many proponents of uniform laws are opposed to achieving uniformity through
federal action. The uniform laws movement has been, in part, a states' rights
movement. See Crook, "Uniform State Laws," 4 TEX. L. REv. 316 (1926); Hart,
"Uniformity of Legislation," 21 Coto. B. A. REP. 96 at II6 (1918); MacChesney,
"Uniform State Laws," 48 CHICAGO LEGAL NEws 353 at 358 (1916).
The administrative feasibility of federal as contrasted with state control may
be one of the limitations on Congress' power under the full faith and credit clause.
This test has been suggested as a guide to Congressional discretion under both the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the interstate commerce clause. See
29 Cot. L. REv. 321 (1929); 33 Cot. L. REv. 854 at 864 (1933).
49
This interpretation should not be made, however. Sec. 3 of the Uniform Act
provides that "the determination of'' the law of another jurisdiction "shall be made
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might provide that the determination of such law shall be reviewable
only in the state courts. An appeal as of right could be taken to the
United States Supreme Court only in the situation where the state
court held the act invalid.50 All other questions involving the construction and application of the act would be reviewable exclusively on
certiorari from the highest state court to the United States Supreme
Court, under the existing federal statutes.51 Since the writ of certiorari
is discretionary with the Supreme Court there is no danger that it
would be burdened with cases involving questions of this nature.

B. Constitutionality
The constitutional authority for a federal judicial notice statute, if
such exists, must be derived primarily from the full faith and credit
clause, which provides: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each
State to the Public Acts, Records and judicial Proceedings of every
by the court and not by the jury, and shdl be remewable." If this provision is carried
into a federal judicial notice statute, it should not be interpreted as modifying the
appellate procedure established by 28 U. S. C. (1934), § 344(a) and (b), for the
review of state supreme court action in the United States Supreme Court, since the
provision merely describes the procedural consequence in state courts of the requirement that the judge shall decide the foreign law and not the jury. See note 37, supra.
Under present practice review is by certiorari in accordance with § 344b when
it is claimed that the state supreme court denied faith and credit to a statute of another
state. See Dodd, "The Power of the Supreme Court to Review State Decisions in the
Field of Conflict of Laws," 39 HARV. L. REv. 533 at 560-561 (1926). And no
reviewable question is presented for the U. S. Supreme Court when it is contended that
the state supreme court erroneously interpreted a sister state statute. Lloyd v. Matthews, 155 U. S. 222, 15 S. Ct. 70 (1894); Glenn v. Garth, 147 U. S. 360, 13 S.
Ct. 350 (1893); Banholzer v. New York Life Ins. Co., 178 U. S. 402, 20 S. Ct.
972 (1900); Eastern Building & Loan Assn. v. Ebaugh, 185 U.S. 114, 22 S. Ct. 566
(1902); Johnson v. New York Life Ins. Co., 187 U. S. 491, 23 S. Ct. 194 (1903);
Allen v. Alleghany Co., 196 U.S. 458, 25 S. Ct. 3II (1905); Smithsonian Institution v. St. John, 214 U. S. 19, 29 S. Ct. 601 (1909); Louisville & Nashville R. R.
v. Melton, 218 U.S. 36, 30 S. Ct. 676 (1910); Texas & New Orleans Ry. v. Miller,
221 U.S. 408, 31 S. Ct. 534 (19II); Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 249 U.S.
490, 39 S. Ct. 336 (1919). Cf. Finney v. Guy, 189 U.S. 335, 23 S. Ct. 558 (1903);
Eastern Building & Loan Assn. v. Williamson, 189 U.S. 122, 23 S. Ct. 527 (1903);
Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U. S. 243, 32 S. Ct. 415 (1912); Modern Woodmen of
America v. Mixer, 267 U. S. 544, 45 S. Ct. 389 (1925); John Hancock Mutual Life
Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178, 57 S. Ct. 129 (1936).
50
28 U.S. C. (1934), § 344 (a). See Rubin and Willner, "Obligatory Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: Appeals from State Courts under Section 237 (a) of the
Judicial Code," 37 M1cH. L. REv. 540 (1939).
51
28 U. S. C. (1934), § 344(b). See Longest v. Langford, 274 U. S. 499,
47 S. Ct. 668 (1927); 5 HUGHES, FEDERAL PRACTICE, § 3348 (1931).
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other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the
Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved,
and the Effect thereof." 52 The scope and meaning of this constitutional
provision can be ascertained best "in the light of the circumstances which
preceded and surrounded its adoption.
I.

Origin of the Full Faith and Credit Clause

The full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution was
derived from the more limited full faith and credit clause in the
Articles of Confederation.58 Although this provision of the Articles of
Confederation was an innovation in many respects, there already existed
in 1778 several colonial statutes which expressed the idea of full faith
and credit in embryonic form.5¼ The origin of the idea is found in these
statutes.55
The English colonies in America were regarded at common law as
foreign to each other for some purposes and a colonial judgment had
the legal effect of a foreign judgment in that it was merely prima facie
evidence of the debt. 56 It followed that the merits of the original claim
could be relitigated in an action in another colony upon such a judgment. 51 This rule encouraged judgment debtors, especially those living
near the boundaries of the colonies, to remove with their effects to a
neighboring colony, making it necessary for creditors to sue them again
U. S. Constitution, Art. IV, § I.
Art. IV: "Full faith and credit shall be given in each of these states to the
records, acts, and judicial proceedings, of the courts and magistrates of every other state."
54
Acts and Resolves of the Province of Massachusetts Bay, sess. of 1773-74, c. 16;
Ga. Colonial Laws (Reprint), p. 7 (Act of Feb, 8, 1757); Del. Laws (1769), c. 196;
Md. Laws (1729), c. 20, reprinted in DoRSEY, PUBLIC LAws oF MARYLAND (1840).
55 For an excellent discussion of the origin of the full faith and credit clause,
see: Ross, "'Full Faith and Credit' in a Federal System," 20 MINN, L. REV. 140
(1936). See also: Abel, "Administrative Determinations and Full Faith and Credit,"
22 lowA L. REV. 461 (1937); Corwin, "The 'Full Faith and Credit' Clause," 81
UNIV, PA. L. REV, 371 (1933); Cook, "The Powers of Congress under the Full Faith
and Credit Clause," 28 YALE L. J. 421 (1919); Costigan, "The History of the
Adoption of Section I of Article IV of the United States Constitution," 4 CoL. L.
REv. 470 (1904); Smith, "The Constitution and the Conflict of Laws," 27 GEo.
L. J. 536 at 536-543 (1939).
56
2 STORY, CoMMENTARIES oN THE CoNSTITUTION oF THE UNITED STATES, 5th
ed., § 1306 (1891), citing Bissell v. Briggs, 9 Mass. 462 at 465 (1813), and Commonwealth v. Green, 17 Mass. 515 at 543 (1822). See: Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S.
113 at 180-181, 16 S. Ct. 139 (1895).
57
2 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, 5th
ed., § 1307 (1891). See also: 2 STORY, CONFLICT OF LAws, 8th ed., §§ 603-608
(1883).
52

58
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in the colony to which they had removed, with the result that a judgment creditor sometimes lost the second suit, even though his claim was
meritorious, because witnesses had died or were otherwise unavailable.Gs
This practice of judgment debtors was also encouraged by the fact
that the judgment creditor could not conveniently prove his judgment
in the second action under the existing rules of evidence.no According to
the common law a colonial judgment could be proved in an English
court or in the court of another colony only by a copy exemplified
under seal or sworn under oath to have been examined with the original. 60 The judgment could not be proved by a copy certified by the
officer of the court who was the custodian of the records, since the
authority to certify public records would not be implied from the
nature of his office as custodian. 61 Apparently no good reason existed
for refusing to receive certified copies, although they were more convenient and less expensive than "sworn" or exemplified copies. Wigmore intimates that the policy may be attributed to the selfishness of
the practitioner who was satisfied with a rule of proof which retained
copying fees and witness fees chiefly in the hands of the lawyer's clerks,
as well as to the favor shown by the Chancery to exemplified copies. 62
In 1774, Massachusetts remedied the situation by adopting a statute
which provided that judgments of other colonies could be proved by
a copy certified by the clerk of the court where rendered, and that such
judgments were conclusive of the merits like domestic judgments.68
118
Story stated that this is one of the reasons why sister state judgments should be
conclusive under the Constitution. STORY, A FAMILIAR EXPOSITION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, § 215 (1840).
119
The preamble to Acts and Resolves of the Province of Massachusetts Bay, sess.
of 1773-74, c. 16: "Whereas it frequently happens that persons against whom final
judgments of court are recovered in the neighboring governments remove with their
effects into this province, without having paid or satisfied such judgment, and upon
actions of debt upon such judgments brought in the executive courts in this province,
the record of such, judgments cannot be removed into said courts in this province, and
it has been made a doubt wbetker by law such, judgments can be admitted as sufficient
evidence of such, judgments, whereby honest creditors are often defrauded••••"
(Italics supplied.)
60
1 STARKIE, EvmENcE, 5th Am. ed., 162-166 (1834); 2 STORY, CoNFLICT
OF LAws, 8th ed., § 635c (1883). See: Appleton v. Lord Braybrook, 6 M. & S. 34,
105 Eng. Rep. n55 (1817); Black v. Lord Braybrook, 6 M. & S. 39, 105 Eng.
Rep. n57 (1817).
61
l GILBERT, EVIDENCE, Lofft ed., 24 (1795); BuLLER, TRIALS AT Nm Pruus,
4th ed., 229 (1785). The rule was applied in Appleton v. Lord Braybrook, 6 M. &
S. 34, 105 Eng. Rep. II55 (1817), where the English court rejected the copy of a
Jamaica judgment not under seal, which was certified by the clerk of court.
62
5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., § 1677 (1940).
68
Acts and Resolves of the Province of Massachusetts Bay, sess. of 1773-74, c. 16.
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This statute is the only one known which designated both the manner
of proving such judgments and their legal effect. Other colonies, however, had statutes which prescribed the method of proving foreign
public records and judicial proceedings. These were undoubtedly
enacted to provide for more expeditious methods of proof and to clarify
the common-law rules of evidence, particularly those relating to the
admissibility of copies of public records. Thus, in 1729, Maryland
enacted a statute which provided that the exemplification of a debt of
record under seal of the foreign court where the judgment was given,
should be "good evidence" to prove the same. 64 In 1769, Delaware
adopted a similar law with reference to wills probated in English
courts or in the courts of other colonies. 65 The act provided that a copy
of the record of a foreign probate proceeding bearing the seal of the
court or of the colony or kingdom where the same was had, should
be "good evidence" in any Delaware court to prove the devise or bequest. 66 Georgia adopted a law in 17 57 which provided that the execution of powers of attorney in another of His Majesty's provinces could
be proved in a Georgia court by the affidavit of a witness or solemn
affirmation in writing before any governor, certified by the governor
under the seal of the province where the power of attorney was executed. 67
These statutes were undoubtedly the precursors of full faith and
credit. The Massachusetts statute in particular resembled the full
Md. Laws (1729), c. zo.
Del. Laws (1769), c. 196. The difficulties which gave rise to this statute are recited in the preamble: ''Whereas many persons residing out of this government have been
seised or possessed of lands, tenements and hereditaments within this government, and
having disposed thereof by their last wills, have died, but by reason of the said wills
being lodged in some office out of this government, persons claiming under the same
cannot produce them in any court of law or equity within this government, to the great
injury of the persons so claiming• •••" (Italics supplied.)
66
Under the English common law the purporting seal of no court of a foreign
state (except a court of admiralty) was presumed genuine, hence an exemplified copy
of a foreign judicial record or proceeding was inadmissible unless a witness was called to
prove the genuineness of the seal. See 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d. ed., 1681 (1940);
7 id., § z 164. No cases have been found interpreting the Maryland and Delaware
statutes, but their purpose may have been to eliminate the necessity for proving the
validity of the seal in this situation.
61
Ga. Colonial Laws (Reprint), p. 7 (Act of Feb. 8, 1757). The purpose of this
statute was to protect owners of Georgia land who had purchased from foreign owners
acting through agents. The preamble states: ''Whereas divers persons living out of this
province, are and have been owners of lands within the same, which persons have
usually appointed attornies to sell and dispose of such lands, to the end therefore that
those who have so purchased may from henceforth be secured in their titles and
estates..••"
64
65
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faith and credit clause in that it declared both the method of proving
the judgments of other colonies and their legal effect when proved.
Thus, it would appear that the idea of full faith and credit grew out
of the need for legislation modifying the common-law rule regarding
the evidentiary effect to be given colonial judgments and the commonlaw rules as to the admission in evidence of copies of foreign public
records. 68
Because there had been a lack of uniformity in these matters, the
framers of the Articles of Confederation apparently thought that a
uniform rule should be adopted. Accordingly, the Continental Congress approved the full faith and credit clause, which provided: "That
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each of these States to the
Records, Acts, and Judicial Proceedings of the Courts and Magistrates
of every other State." 69 But uniformity was not achieved. The courts
disagreed as to the meaning of this provision. Some decisions indicated
that sister state judgments were conclusive of the merits; 70 some that
the common law was unchanged and that such judgments were merely
prima facie evidence.71
Story said that it was the failure of the Articles of Confederation to
accomplish uniformity in· this respect which led the Federal Convention to give Congress legislative power under the full faith and credit
clause.72 This is entirely probable. Undoubtedly the drafters of the
Constitution were concerned about the effect of sister state judgments,
but the proceedings of the Convention reveal that this was considered
to be only part of a much larger question, the uniform recognition and
enforcement of public acts, records and judicial proceedings; and that
the power of Congress was intended to encompass this broader area of
action.
68
Professor Corwin states that the historical background of the full faith and credit
clause is furnished by that branch of the law known as conflict of laws. Corwin, "The
'Full Faith and Credit' Clause," 81 UNJv. PA. L. REv. 371 (1933). It would seem,
rather, that the origin of the clause can be traced to the necessity for modifying certain
rules of evidence and procedure, particularly those affecting the enforcement of foreign
judgments.
69
Articles of Confederation, Art. IV. Text reprinted in American History Leaflets
No. 20 and stated to have been copied directly from the original manuscript.
70 Jenkins v. Putnam, I Bay (S. C.) 8 (1784); Kibbe v. Kibbe, Kirby (Conn.)
119 (1786).
71
James v. Allen, 1 Dall. (1 U. S.) 188 (1786); Phelps v. Holker, 1 Dall.
( 1 U. S.) 261 ( 1788) (both decided by the courts of Pennsylvania). See discussion
of cases under Articles of Confederation in Hitchcock v. Aicken, I Caines (N. Y.)
460 (1803).

72 2 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES,

5th ed.,§ 1307 (1891).
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The first draft of the full faith and credit clause appeared in the
report of the committee of detail which was submitted to the Convention, August 6, 1787.78 It provided that full faith and credit should be
given legislative acts as well as judicial records and proceedings, but
there was no provision for conferring legislative powers upon Congress.
When this draft was discussed on August 29, Madison suggested that
Congress be given the power to provide for the execution of judgments
in other states under such regulations as might be expedient.74 Morris
made a broader proposal. He moved that Congress be empowered to
determine the proof and effect of the public acts, records and judicial
proceedings of the states.75 It seems, however, that Madison's suggestion was adopted by the committee to which the clause had been committed, as appears from the draft reported to the Convention on September r:
"Full faith and credit ought to be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records and Judicial proceedings of every other State,
and the Legislature shall by general laws prescribe the manner in
which such acts, records, and proceedings shall be proved, and the
effect which judgments obtained in one State shall have in
another." 76
'
Morris thereupon moved to amend the committee report by striking out the words "judgments obtained in one State shall have in another" and inserting the word "thereof" after the word "effect." 71
The following discussion ensued:
"Col. Mason favored the motion, particularly if the 'effect'
was to be restrained to judgments & Judicial proceedings.
"Mr. Wilson remarked, that if the Legislature were not allowed to declare the effect the provision would amount to nothing
more than what now takes place among all Independent Nations.
"Doer. Johnson thought the amendment as worded would
authorize the Genl. Legislature to declare the effect of Legislative acts of one State, in another State.
"Mr. Randolph considered it as strengthening the general
objection agst. the plan, that its definition of the powers of the
Government was so loose as to give it opportunities of usurping
78

2 FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF

(1911).
74

75
76

77

2

2
2

2

id. 448.
id. 448.
id. 483-484.
id. 488.
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all the State powers. He was for not going farther than the Report, which enables the Legislature to provide for the effect of
Judgments." 78
The Morris amendment was adopted despite the criticism of Randolph that the powers conferred upon Congress "were so loose as to
give it opportunities of usurping all the State powers." 79 Undoubtedly
the Federal Convention fully appreciated that Congress would have
broad powers under its authority to declare the effect of legislative acts
and judicial proceedings as well as judgments.
Upon Madison's motion "ought to" was struck out of the clause
reported by the committee, and "shall" was inserted between "credit"
and "given"; "shall" between "Legislature" and "by general laws"
was struck out and "may" inserted.80 No discussion of this motion was
reported, but it would seem that by deliberately substituting "may"
for "shall" the Convention intended that Congress' power to legislate
in this field was not to be exclusive, but was to be concurrent with that
of the states.

Scope of Full Faith and Credit Clause
(a) Interpretation by Congress and the Courts
The clause, as finally adopted, provides:
"Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
Public Acts, Records and judicial Proceedings of every other
State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved,
and the Effect thereof." 81
2.

Pursuant to the authority thus conferred, Congress enacted statutes
in I 790 and I 80I, which are embraced in sections 90 5 and 906 of the
78
2
79 2

id. 488-489.
id. 488-489. Madison, however, did not believe that the clause would have
a far-reaching effect. He made the following comment in THE FEDERALIST, No. 42
[Ford ed., p. 279 (1878)]: "The power of prescribing by general laws the manner in
which the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of each State shall be proved
and the effect they shall have in other States, is an evident and valuable improvement
on the clause relating to this subject in the articles of Confederation. The meaning of
the latter is extremely indeterminate, and can be of little importance under any interpretation which it will bear. The power here established may be rendered a very convenient instrument of justice, and be particularly beneficial on the borders of contiguous States, where the effects liable to justice may be suddenly and secretly translated, in any stage of the process, within a foreign jurisdiction."
80
2 FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, p. 489
(1937).
81 U. S. Constitution, Art. IV, § 1.

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 40

Revised Statutes. 82 Section 905 prescribes the manner of authenticating the statutes and the judicial records and proceedings of the states
and territories and countries subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States. It then provides that "the records and judicial proceedings,
so authenticated, shall have such faith and credit given to them in every
court within the United States as they have by law or usage in the
courts of the State from which they are taken." Section 906 has similar
provisions with respect to nonjudicial public records.
Certain generalizations may be made from an examination of these
statutes: ( r) The power to prescribe "the manner" in which public
acts, records and judicial proceedings "shall be proved" was construed
by these Congressional enactments to mean the power to declare the
method of authentication required for the admission of statutes and
records in evidence.
The main result in the field of evidence and procedure has been
to give the states uniform rules for proving the public records and
statutes of sister states whenever they are relevant evidence in a case.
However, many states have enacted statutes which prescribe methods
of authentication differing from those designated by Congress, and it
has been held that sister state records and statutes are admissible in
evidence if authenticated in compliance with either the federal requirements or those of the forum. 83
( 2) The power to prescribe "the effect" of public acts, records and
82

Rev. Stat. (1878), §§ 905,906, 28 U.S. C. (1934), §§ 687,688.
Goodwyn v. Goodwyn, 25 Ga. 203 (1858); People ex rel. Johnson v. Miller,
195 Ill. 621, 63 N. E. 504 (1902); Petty v. Hayden, n5 Iowa 212, 88 N. W.
339 (1901); Sullivan v. Kenney, 148 Iowa 361, 126 N. W. 349 (1910); Tomlin v.
Woods, 125 Iowa 367, IOI N. W. 135 (1904); Reed v. Stevens, 120 Me. 290, 113
A. 712 (1921); Kingman v. Cowles, 103 Mass. 283 (1869); Portland Maine Pub.
Co. v. Eastern Tractors Co., 289 Mass. 13, 193 N. E. 888 (1935); Willock v. Wilson,
178 Mass. 68, 59 N. E. 757 (1901); In re Ellis' Estate, 55 Minn. 401, 56 N. W.
1056 (1893); Gribble v. Pioneer Press Co., (C. C. Minn. 1883) 15 F. 689; Logansport Gas Light & Coke Co. v. Knowles, (C. C. Minn. 1871) 15 F. Cas. No. 8466;
Mobile & 0. R. R. v. Swain, 164 Miss. 825, 145 So. 627 (1933); Barlow v. Steel,
65 Mo. 6II (1887); Duvall v. Ellis, 13 Mo. 203 (1850); Etz v. Wheeler, 23 Mo.
App. 449 (1886); Karr v. Jackson, 28 Mo. 316 (1859); State v. Hendrix, 331 Mo.
658, 56 S. W. (2d) 76 (1932); Hewit v. Bank of Indian Territory, 64 Neb. 463, 90
N. W. 250, 92 N. W. 741 (1902); Title Guaranty & Trust Co. v. Trenton Potteries
Co., 56 N. J. Eq. 441, 38 A. 422 (1897); United States Vinegar Corp. v. Foehrenbach, 148 N. Y. 58, 42 N. E. 403 (1893); Wells, Fargo & Co. v. Davis, 105 N. Y.
670, 12 N. E. 42 (1887); Block v. Shafer, 62 Okla. n4, 162 P. 456 (1917); Otto
v. Trump, II5 Pa. 425, 8 A. 786 (1887); Campbell v. Home Ins. Co., I Rich. (1
S. C.) 158 (1869); Tourtelot v. Booker, (Tex. Civ. App. 1913) 160 S. W. 293;
Wolf v. King, 49 Tex. Civ. App. 41, 107 S. W. 617 (1908); Ritchie v. Carpenter,
2 Wash. 512, 28 P. 380 (1891); Ordway v. Conroe, 4 Wis. 59 (1854). See also:
Tarlton v. Broscoe, 8 Ky. 67 (1817); Barbour v. Watts, 9 Ky. 290 (1820); A.
88
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judicial proceedings was interpreted by Congress to mean the power
to determine their effect when authenticated. 84 The "faith and credit"
which is given the records and judicial proceedings of sister states at
common law is superseded by the statutes which provide that such
records and proceedings shall have the faith and credit which they are
given by law or usage in the state from which they are taken. No such
provision was made, however, with respect to legislative acts. The
effect to be given them when properly authenticated was not determined.
Lehmann & Co. v. Rivers, II0 La. 1079, 35 So. 296 (1903); Hope v. Hurt, 59 Miss.
174 (1881). (The federal statute provides the exclusive method of proof in the
absence of a state statute on the subject.)
Caperton v. Ballard, 14 Wall. (81 U. S.) 238 (1872), holds that no federal
question is presented under the full faith and credit clause unless the record of a sister
state is authenticated in the manner prescribed by Congress, since the states are obligated
to give full faith and credit, under the federal statutes, only where the method of
authentication set out in the federal statutes is followed. This seems to have been overlooked in many cases.
54, Although the federal statutes require that the legal effect of records and judicial
proceedings be determined by the law or usage of the state of origin, Congress did not
designate the procedure for ascertaining such law or usage. This was left to the states.
Hanley v. Donoghue, II6 U.S. 1, 6 S. Ct. 242 (1885); Adam v. Saenger, 303 U. S.
59, 58 S. Ct. 454 (1938); Springs v. James, (C. C. Ga. 1909) 172 F. 626. Accordingly, when the law of a sister state is material in a case for the purpose of determining
the "faith and credit'' which is given in that state to a record or proceeding, most courts
have held that such law is a fact which must be proved. It will not be judicially
noticed. When there is a failure of proof the courts indulge in presumptions as to the
sister state law. Hanley v. Donoghue, II6 U. S. I at 5, 6 S. CT. 242 (1885); Chicago
& Alton R. R. v. Wiggins Ferry Co., II9 U. S. 615 at 622, 7 S. Ct. 398 (1887);
Eastern B. & L. Assn. v. Williamson, 189 U. S. 122 at 125, 23 S. Ct. 527 (1903);
Finney v. Guy, 189 U.S. 335 at 340, 343, 23 S. Ct. 558 (1903); Allen v. Alleghany
Co., 196 U.S. 458 at 464, 25 S. Ct. 3II (1905); Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59 at
63, 58 S. Ct. 454 (1938); Sammis v. Wightman, 31 Fla. 10, 12 So. 526 (1893);
Leathe v. Thomas, 218 Ill. 246, 75 N. E. 810 (1905); Baltimore & 0. S. W. R. R.
v. McDonald, II2 Ill. App. 391 (1903); Taylor, Shipton & Co. v. Runyan & Brown,
9 Iowa 522 (1859); Crafts v. Clark, 31 Iowa 77 (1870); Robinson v. Chicago, R. I.
& P. Ry., 96 Kan. 137, 150 P. 636 (1915), affd. 96 Kan. 654, 153 P. 494 (1915);
Alexander v. Gray, (La. App. 1938) 181 So. 639; Norman v. Pennsylvania Fire Ins.
Co., 237 Mo. 576, 141 S. W. 618 (19II); In re Bruhns' Estate, 58 Mont. 526, 193
P. II 15 (1920); Field v. Cain, 9 N. M. 283, 50 P. 327 (1897); Pelton v. Platner,
13 Ohio 209 (1844); Gill v. Everman, 94 Tex. 209, 59 S. W. 531 (1900); Tourtelot v. Booker, (Tex. Civ. App. 1913) 160 S. W. 293; Home Brewing Co. v.
American Chemical & Ozokerite Co., 58 Utah 219, 198 P. 170 (1921); Hunt v.
Monroe, 32 Utah 428, 91 P. 269 (1907); Ellisv. Gordon, 202 Wis. 134,231 N. W.
585 (1930) (judicial notice statute not cited); Osborn v. Blackburn, 78 Wis. 209, 47
N. W. 175 (1890); Rape v. Heaton, 9 Wis. 301 (1859).
A minority of courts hold that they have a duty to take judicial notice in this
situation. State of Ohio v. Hinchman, 27 Pa. St. 479 (1856); Paine v. Schenectady
Ins. Co., II R. I. 4u (1876).
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The principal result in the conflict of laws field has been to leave
the enforcement of causes of action, where the operative facts occur
in a sister state, at the mercy of the adverse policy of the forum, except
in two situations: Where the cause of action arises on a judgment,85
or under a statute in certain cases.86 Thus, where suit is brought in
State Y upon a judgment obtained in State X the merits of the claim
upon which the judgment is founded may not be litigated. The Congressional statutes provide that such a judgment shall have the "faith
and credit" which it has in the state of origin and since it is conclusive
of the merits there it is conclusive evidence in the forum. Where suit
is brought in State Y upon a cause of action involving a statute in State
X, the forum is obligated to apply the statute of State X in those cases
where State X has a "governmental interest" in the cause of action,ssa
even though the public policy of the forum is opposed to its enforcement. The "governmental interest" test has not been fully defined, but
it seems that a statute is entitled to full faith and credit if the subject
matter thereof falls peculiarly within the regulatory power of the
enacting state. Since Congress did not declare what "faith and credit"
should be given legislative acts of sister states, the Supreme Court has
accomplished this result by holding that the clause is self-executing to
a limited extent. In other words the first sentence of the clause, which
provides that full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the
acts, records, and proceedings of every other state, is interpreted as
placing a direct duty upon state courts to apply the statutes of sister
states in certain cases involving choice of law even though the policy
of the forum is opposed to such statutes.87
85

Corwin, "The 'Full Faith and Credit' Clause," 81 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 371
(1933).
86
The cases are fully discussed in: Hilpert and Cooley, "The Federal Constitution
and the Choice of Law," 25 WAsH. UNiv. L. Q. 27 (1939); Ross, "'Full Faith and
Credit' in a Federal System," 20 MINN. L. REv. 140 ( 1936); Ross, "Has Conflict of
Laws Become a Branch of Constitutional Law?" 15 Minn. L. Rev. 161 (1931);
Langmaid, "The Full Faith and Credit Required for Public Acts," 24 ILL. L. REV.
383 (1929); Field, "Judicial Notice of Public Acts under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause," 12 MINN. L. REV. 439 (1928); 45 YALE L. J. 339 (1935).
86
a See discussions cited note 86, supra.
87
The cases frequently assert in dictum that the full faith and credit clause declares a rule of evidence only. Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting
Co., 225 U.S. II I at 134, 32 S. Ct. 641 (1912); Anglo-American Provision Co. v.
Davis Provision Co. No. 1, 191 U. S. 373 at 374, 24 S. Ct. 92 (1903); Andrews
v. Andrews, 188 U. S. 14 at 36, 23 S. Ct. 237 (1903); Cole v. Cunningham, 133
U. S. 107 at II2, 10 S. Ct. 269 (1890); Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U. S.
265 at 291-292, 8 S. Ct. 1370 (1888); Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall. (85 U.S.)
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Obviously, Congress did not attempt to execute all of the powers
conferred upon it by the full faith and credit clause. In the words of
Professor Cook, Congress "has attempted to prescribe the effect of
records and judicial proceedings only, and as to those has contented
itself with repeating the language of the constitution about 'full faith
and credit'-language the meaning of which we are still litigating at
the end of one hundred and thirty years." 88 Undoubtedly Congress
has immense powers, not yet fully defined by the Supreme Court, to
declare rules for the enforcement and recognition in each state of sister
state public acts, records, and judicial proceedings; and it is clear that
such powers exceed the limits which have been described by the
Supreme Court in giving the clause a self-executing effect. Thus, Justice Stone has said:
"The mandatory force of the full faith and credit clause as
defined by this Court may be, in some degree not yet fully defined, expanded or contracted by Congress. Much of the confusion
and procedural deficiencies which the constitutional provision alone
has not avoided may be remedied by legislation. . .. The constitutional provision giving Congress power to prescribe the effect to
be given to acts, records and proceedings would have been quite
unnecessary had it not been intended that Congress should have a
latitude broader than that given the courts by the full faith and
credit clause alone." 89

457 at 461-463 (1874); United States Fidelity & Guarantee Co. v. Lawson, (D. C.
Ga. 1936) 15 F. Supp. II6 at 120; In re C. A. Taylor Logging & Lumber Co.,
(D. C. Wash. 1928) 28 F. (2d) 526 at 529; Israel v. Israel, (C. C. Pa. 1904) 130
F. 237 at 238-239; Clifford v. Williams, (C. C. Wash. 1904) 131 F. 100 at 105.
The dictum in these cases was derived from the following statement of Story: "The
constitution did not mean to confer any new power upon the states, but simply to
regulate the effect of their acknowledged jurisdiction over persons and things within
their territory. It did not make the judgments of other states domestic judgments to
all intents and purposes, but only gave a general validity, faith and credit to them as
evidence." STORY, CoNFLICT OF LAws, 8th ed., § 609 (1883). This view is erroneous.
The proceedings of the Constitutional Convention intimate that the clause was to have
a wider meaning. See pp. 190-191, supra. And the decisions of the Supreme Court which
hold that certain choice of law questions are governed by the Constitution also expose
the fallacy of this dictum. See I ILL. L. REv. 256 at 258-259 (1906).
88 Cook, "The Powers ot Congress under the Full Faith and Credit Clause," 28
YALE L. J. 421 at 426 (1919).
89
Yarbrough v. Yarbrough, 290 U.S. 202 at 215, note 2, 54 S. Ct. 181 (1933),
dissenting opinion. See also: Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 306 U.S. 493 at 502, 59 S. Ct. 629 (1939); Bank of the State of Alabama
v. Dalton, 9 How. (50 U. S.) 522 at 527 (1850).
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(b) Potential Power of Congress
What, then, is the possible scope of Congress' power under the full
faith and credit clause?
The first sentence of the clause states its purposes and describes the
full extent of the duties which it imposes: "Full faith and credit shall
be given in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state." The second sentence confers upon Congress
the power to declare in greater detail the ends expressed in the first
sentence and the means by which they may be attained: "And the Congress may by general laws prescribe the manner in which such acts,
records, and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof." The
limits of Congressional power are to be found in the first sentence as
well as in the second, since a statute of Congress could not validly
embrace objects not stated in l?oth. It would seem, however, that the
two sentences are equally extensive. Undoubtedly, "full faith and
credit" refers to the recognition and enforcement 90 which states 01
shall accord to acts, records, and proceedings of other states, and Congress is empowered by the second sentence to enact all substantive and
procedural rules reasonably necessary to accomplish the recognition and
enforcement to which "full faith and credit" refers. 02 This power has
90
An analytical distinction between recognition and enforcement is intended,
which is analogous to the difference between substance and procedure. See Yntema,
"The Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Anglo-American Law," 33 M1cH. L.
REV. II29 at 1132 (1935). Admittedly, the distinction between substance and procedure varies according to the purpose for which it is made, and in the conflicts field
it determines the extent to which the foreign law is applied in a particular case. See
Cook, "'Substance' and 'Procedure' in the Conflicts of Laws," 42 YALE L. J. 332
( 1933). Nevertheless, the .phrasing of the full faith a11d credit clause suggests this
terminology since the clause is concerned not only with the procedural means of giving
effect to public acts, records and judicial proceedings, but also with the substantive
effect which should be given to them.
91
The clause provides that full faith and credit shall be given "in each state"
and not "by each state," which raises a question whether the duty may be imposed upon
other than state agencies. This is not important here, however, because the duty at
least rests upon those agencies and most certainly upon the state courts. See: Minnesota
v. Northern Securities Co., 194 U. S. 48 at 72, 24 S. Ct. 598 (1904). Rev. Stat.
(1878), § 905, 28 U.S. C. (1934), § 687 places the duty to accord faith and credit
upon "every court within the United States" whereas Rev. Stat. (1878), § 906, 28
U. S. C. (1934), § 688 imposes the duty upon "every court and office within the
United States."
92 The second sentence provides that Congress "may" enact general laws. The
proceedings of the Federal Convention reveal that "may'' was substituted for "shall"
in an earlier draft, but the reason for the change does not appear. See supra at note
So. Undoubtedly, it was intended that Congress could execute its powers if it chose
but that matters involving full faith and credit should be left to state regulation in the
absence of any Congressional legislation.

1941

J

JumcIAL NoTICE AcT

1 97

two aspects which are analytically distinguishable: Congress is not only
authorized to prescribe the procedural method of enforcing acts,
records and proceedings, but it may also declare their substantive effect in the forum.
What is meant by "full faith and credit"? Does it mean that acts,
records, and proceedings shall be given the same faith and credit
(i.e., the same recognition and enforcement) in the forum which is
given them by the state of origin? 98 Less faith and credit? More faith
and credit? Or all of the faith and credit which a state reasonably can
be compelled to give? Since the clause provides that full faith and
credit shall be given, it would appear that Congress may require a state
to give the acts, records and proceedings of sister states all of the
recognition and enforcement which is reasonable, subject to limitations
imposed by other clauses of the Constitution.94
It has been urged that the purpose of the full faith and credit
clause is to achieve uniformity, simplicity, and certainty in the recognition and enforcement of the legal standards of each state throughout
the union in cases of national concern, and that the words "public
acts, records and judicial proceedings" are sufficiently comprehensive to
include all legal standards officially established by a state, whether they
are established by judicial acts or by legislative acts. Consequently the
Constitution enjoins the states to give full faith and credit to both com98
Some cases have stated that the Constitution obliges the forum to give judgments and decrees the effect to which they are entitled in the state where rendered.
Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562 at 567, 26 S. Ct. 525 (1905); Harding v.
Harding, 198 U.S. 317 at 341, 25 S. Ct. 679 (1905). These statements are dicta, however, since the question presented was the meaning of the acts of Congress, and the
cases decide merely that Congress has declared that judicial proceedings shall have
some of the effects which they have in the state of origin. See criticism in 1 ILL. L.
REV. 256 (1906). In those cases where the Constitution directly operates upon the
states and requires that full faith and credit be given statutes of other states, it has been
said that such statutes must be given the effect which they have in the enacting state.
This is not true in all cases, however. Thus, statutory causes of action are entitled under
the Constitution to enforcement in other states although the statutes creating such
causes of action limit suits thereunder to courts of the enacting state. Atchison, T. &
S. F. Ry. v. Sowers, 213 U. S. 55, 29 S. Ct. 397 (1909); Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.
Co. v. George, 233 U. S. 354, 34 S. Ct. 587 (1914); Kenney v. Supreme Lodge,
252 U. S. 4n, 40 S. Ct. 371 (1920). See also: Milwaukee County v. M. E. White
Co., 296 U. S. 268 at 274-275, 56 S. Ct. 229 (1935).
9
' For example, Congress probably could not provide that judgments rendered
without jurisdiction are entitled to enforcement in other states because this would
violate due process. Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225
U. S. II l at 134, 32 S. Ct. 641 (1912); Old Wayne Mutual Life Assn. v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8 at 15, 27 S. Ct. 236 (1907); Garland Co. v. Filmer, (D. C.
Cal. 1932) 1 F. Supp. 8 at 12.
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mon law and statutes; and no state court may refuse to apply the law
of a sister state in a case involving a foreign element where the sister
state has an interest in the outcome of the suit which outweighs the
interest of the forum. 95
If this is the purpose of the clause it would seem that Congress has
full competence to enact choice of law rules. Moreover, it would appear
that Congress has power to enact procedural laws ( such as a judicial
notice law) which uniformly expedite the application of foreign law,
since complete uniformity and certainty can be achieved only by the
establishment of uniform procedure.
It is doubtful, however, whether Congress may regulate all choice
of law questions. 96 Whatever the powers of Congress may be in this
respect, it is unnecessary to discuss them at length because the authority
to prescribe rules for the enforcement of sister state public acts, records
and judicial proceedings is governed by di:fferent considerations. For
example, a crucial constitutional question in the choice of law field is
the scope of Congress' power to require the forum to decide a case
according to the foreign law when, under its conflicts rule, the forum
would deny the action because its enforcement would be contrary to
See Smith, "The Constitution and the Conflict of Laws," 27 GEo. L. J. 536
at 555-558 (1939).
96 See: Yntema, "The Hornbook Method and the Conflict of Laws," 37 YALE
L. J. 468 at 481-482 (1928}; Dodd, "The Power of the Supreme Court to Review
State Decisions in the Field of Conflict of Laws," 39 HARv. L. REv. 533 (1926).
It has been assumed that the clause does not compel a state court to apply the
common law of a sister state in a suit upon a cause of action arising in that state which
has not been reduced to judgment. Wiggins' Ferry Co. v. Chicago & Alton Ry.,
(C. C. Mo. 1882) II F. 381 at 384, affirmed 108 U. S. 18, 1 S. Ct. 614 (1883);
In re Patterson's Estate, 64 Cal. App. 643, 222 P. 374 ( 1923), writ of error dismissed sub nom. Patterson v. Patterson, 266 U. S. 594, 45 S. Ct. 225 (1924); Esmar
v. Haeussler, 341 Mo. 33, 106 S. W. (2d) 412 (1937). See Cook, "The Powers of
Congress under the Full Faith and Credit Clause," 28 YALE L. J. 421 at 434 (1919).
But see: Commonwealth Fuel Co. v. McNeil, 103 Conn. 390, 130 A. 794 (1925);
13 ILL. L. REV. 43 at 57 (1918); 40 YALE L. J. 291 at 295 (1930). The acts of
Congress require that judgments be given the effect they have by "law _or usage" in the
state of origin if that law is proven, and the Supreme Court will review a decision of the
forum which allegedly applied that law incorrectly. To this extent the clause undoubtedly compels recognition of the common law as well as statutes. Titus v. Wallick,
306 U.S. 282 at 287-288, 59 S. Ct. 557 (1939); Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59 at
64, 58 S. Ct. 454 (1938). The common law has been adopted in most states by statute
or constitutional provision and to the extent that it has a statutory basis it might be
considered a "public act" within the meaning of the Constitution. See: RAmN, ANGLOAMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY,§ 194 (1936); WALSH, A HISTORY OF ANGLO-AMERICAN
LAW, 2d ed., § 47 (1932); Pope, "The English Common Law in the United States,"
24 HARV. L. REv. 6 at 20-23 (1910); Frierson, "A Revolutionary Decision-Erie v.
Tompkins," 8 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1221 at 1225 (1940).
95
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public policy. Whether Congress may require that the public policy of
one state shall be subordinated to the public policy of another when
they are in conflict involves a determination of the "governmental
interest" of the states concerned in the final disposition of the suit. But
this question is not presented where Congress designates the procedure
which state courts must observe in enforcing the acts, records and proceedings of other states.97 Here the criterion of Congressional power,
as we shall see, is whether the federal statute establishes an expeditious
remedy. 98
The two areas of Congressional power overlap but are not coextensive. The power to command the forum to apply the substantive
law of another state in certain cases undoubtedly includes the power
to impose procedural rules which facilitate the application of that law.
But the authority to adopt procedural laws is not restricted to those
cases only. Congress may prescribe the procedure for ascertaining the
law of a sister state even though the forum is not obligated by the Constitution or by acts of Congress to apply that law in a particular case,
but does so under its choice of law rule. This is demonstrated by the fact
that Congress has prescribed the method of proving the statutory law of
a sister state, which is applicable whenever the forum applies that law,
either because of constitutional mandate or by virtue of the forum's
common-law conflicts rule.99 Federal authority in this respect has never
been doubted, since statutes are "public acts," and Congress has the
power to prescribe the "manner" in which "public acts" shall be
91
We are not concerned here with the power of Congress to require the forum
to apply the procedural law of a sister state. The criteria which would determine the
validity of such a statute would be similar to those governing Congress' power to require
the application of foreign substantive law. See: Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Sowers, 213
U. S. 55, 29 S. Ct. 397 (1909); Tennessee, C., I. & R. Co. v. George, 233 U. S.
354, 34 S. Ct. 587 (1914); John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S.
178, 57 S. Ct. 129 (1936); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 306 U. S. 493, 59 S. Ct. 629 (1939).
Nor are we concerned with the power of Congress to regulate the jurisdiction
of state courts in cases involving foreign judgments and statutory causes of action to
which full faith and credit must be given. A federal judicial notice statute would not
interfere with the jurisdiction of state courts. See: Anglo-American Provision Co. v.
Davis Provision Co. No. 1, 191 U. S. 373, 24 S. Ct. 92 (1903); Weidman v. Weidman, 274 Mass. II8, 174 N. E. 206 (1931); I WILLOUGHBY, CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES, 2d. ed., § 151 (1929); Smith, "The Constitution and the
Conflict of Laws," 27 GEo. L. ]. 536 at 571-572 (1939); Abel, "Administrative Determinations and Full Faith and Credit," 22 lowA L. REv. 461 at 514 (1937).
98
See infra, pp. 202-203.
99
Baggett v. Davis, 124 Fla. 701, 169 So. 372 (1936); New York, C. & St. L.
Ry. v. Lind, 180 Ind. 38, 102 N. E. 449 (1913); Burge v. Broussard, (Tex. Civ.
App. 1924) 258 S. W. 502. See 4 JoNEs, EVIDENCE, 2d ed., § 1721 (1926).
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"proved" in every case in which they are relevant evidence.10° Furthermore it is apparent that Congress has authority to enact many procedural laws which strictly speaking have no bearing on choice of law
questions. Illustrative of this is the power to prescribe the manner of
authenticating nonjudicial public records which Congress exercised in
enacting section 906 of the Revised Statutes.101
Because the present federal statutes have a restricted operation,
the cases do not furnish definite clues concerning the potentialities
of federal action in the procedural :field. In the absence of more extensive legislation it has been assumed that the states may determine the
remedy in cases involving a foreign element,102 and the question has
been whether the full faith and credit clause and the enabling statutes
place any restrictions upon the states in this respect.
Christmas v. Russell 108 was the first case in which the Supreme
Court invalidated a state statute because of an implied prohibition in
the full faith and credit claµse and statutes of Congress. Plaintiff
brought suit in Mississippi upon a judgment which was rendered in
Kentucky against a Mississippi resident when the cause of action would
have been barred if suit had been brought in Mississippi. A Mississippi
statute expressly barred actions upon judgments obtained in those circumstances. Although in form a limitation law, in effect the statute
denied the right to sue upon a valid judgment of another state. In
declaring the statute void, the United States Supreme Court announced
that the test for determining the constitutionality of remedial statutes
was their reasonableness. The Court said:
". . • Reasons of sound policy have led to the adoption of
limitation laws, both by Congress and the States, and, if not unreasonable in their terms, their validity cannot be questioned. . ..
Cases, however, may arise where the provisions of the statute on
that subject may be so stringent and unreasonable as to amount
to a denial of the right and in that event a different rule would
prevail as it could no longer be said that the remedy only was
affected by the new legislation." 104
100

The federal statute prescribing the method of authenticating state statutes was
in existence more than 70 years before the Supreme Court discovered that the full faith
and credit clause had any application to choice of law questions.
101 See supra at note 82.
102 McElmoyle v. Cohen, 13 Pet. (38 U. S.) 312 (1839); Bank of the State
of Alabama v. Dalton, 9 How. (50 U.S.) 522 (1850).
108 5 Wall. (72 U. S.) 290 (1866).
104 Id. at 300. Accord: Keyser v. Lowell, (C. C. A. 8th, 1902) II7 F. 400.
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Although the statute entirely denied enforcement of the judgment,
it seems clear that the Court would have achieved the same result if
the statute had provided an unreasonably short time to sue. Accordingly, the decision forecast the holding of the circuit court of appeals
in Lamb v. Powder River Live Stock Co. 105 In that case a Colorado
statute provided that actions upon judgments obtained in other states
against Colorado residents were barred six years after the judgments
were rendered, provided that no action could be maintained upon a
judgment three months after reJ?.dition if six years had elapsed since
the accrual of the cause of action upon which the judgment was
founded. Plaintiff recovered a judgment upon a contract in Nebraska
and sued upon the judgment in a federal court in Colorado more than
six years after the contract cause of action accrued and more than three
months after the judgment was recovered. The court held that the
Colorado statute was invalid because the three months limitation did
not afford judgment creditors of other states reasonable opportunity to
enforce their judgments in Colorado courts. The decision was based
upon the full faith and credit clause and the clause prohibiting the
impairment of the obligation of contracts.
In Broderick v. Rosner 106 the underlying principle of the foregoing
cases was affirmed and extended to a different kind of remedial statute,
although the Supreme Court did not frame its decision in terms of
reasonableness. In that case an action at law was brought in New
Jersey by the New York superintendent of banks to recover unpaid
assessments levied upon the New Jersey stockholders of a New York
bank. A New Jersey statute provided that no law action might be
maintained in this situation, but that the proper remedy was a bill in
equity for an accounting to which the corporation and all of the creditors and stockholders were necessary parties. Only a few of the
20,843 stockholders and 400,000 depositors and creditors resided in
New Jersey, and it was therefore, impossible to serve all of them personally. Moreover, even though jurisdiction over all of the nonresidents could have been obtained by service by publication, the fees
and expenses of such service would have exceeded the aggregate
amount due from the New Jersey stockholders. This made it practically impossible to secure jurisdiction over all. The Court held that
suit could be maintained nevertheless; to sustain the asserted bar of the
statute would violate the full faith and credit clause.
It may be concluded that a state is prohibited from enacting a
105
106

(C. C. A. 8th, 1904) 132 F. 434•
294 U.S. 629, 55 S. Ct. 589 (1935).
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statute which in terms or practical operation bars the enforcement of
judgments or statutory causes of action entitled to constitutional protection, or which denies reasonable opportunity to bring such suits in
state courts having general jurisdiction over the subject matter and
parties.107 A further deduction is that Congress may prohibit the states
from adopting unreasonable remedies in this situation. For instance,
Congress probably would have the power to interdict all state statutes
which barred action upon sister state judgments after three months.
But may Congress affirmatively specify the period of limitations in such
suits? What is the extent of Congress' authority to enact procedural
laws? These questions are not fully answered by the cases, and for this
reason it is necessary to sketch the limits of Congress' power in the light
' of the clause's objectives.
Having in mind the historical background of the clause,108 we submit that Congress has complete power to enact uniform procedural
laws which establish certain, prompt, inexpensive and effective means
of enforcing throughout the Union the acts, records and judicial proceedings of the states in order to expedite the uniform recognition of
substantive rights and duties in transactions or suits involving those
acts, records and proceedings.109 The power to prescribe the manner
of proving acts records and proceedings and their effect is literally
broad enough to sustain the enactment of any laws in this regard. However the statement of the clause's purpose in these terms suggests a line
between those powers which belong to Congress and those which belong to the states under the Tenth Amendment, for it would seem that
if a particular procedural law does not facilitate the recognition of substantive rights and duties it falls outside the scope of Congress' power.
Thus, cases may arise where the federal statute may be justified by a
literal interpretation of the Constitution but where the exercise of
power is invalid because it does not pertain to full faith and credit.
Suppose, for instance, Congress designated the venue in suits upon
107 The problem is analogous in some respects to the question which has arisen
when a legislature has changed the remedy with respect to existing contracts and the
Court has held that unreasonable changes were invalid because they impaired the obligations of those contracts. In Christmas v. Russell, 5 Wall. (72 U.S.) 290 (1866), the
Court relied on Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. (42 U.S.) 311 (1843), an impairment of
contracts case. See similar analogies cited in Lamb v. Powder River Live Stock Co.,
(C. C. A. 8th, 1904) 132 F. 434 at 441. In the future the Court will probably
rely upon these analogies in developing the doctrine of reasonableness in the full faith
and credit field.
108
See supra, pp. 189-191.
109 See Yntema, "The Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Anglo-American
Law," 33 M1cH. L. REv. 1129 at 1164 (1935).
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judgments of sister states. Literally, this might be the "manner" of
"proving'' judgments and their "effect" in other states, yet it is doubtful whether the statute could be sustained because Congressional designation of the place of trial would not expedite the extrastate enforcement of judgments in the usual case. On the other hand, a federal
statute providing for the direct enforcement of state judgments in
other states by execution without requiring a second suit would provide an expeditious method of enforcement and therefore would probably be within the power of Congress.110 It is impossible to foresee,
of course, where the line will be drawn in all cases, but it would seem
that the question whether a particular remedy facilitates the recognition of substantive rights is one of reasonableness. Since the Supreme
Court's approach to the question would be analogous to that taken in
the police power cases under the due process clause, a federal statute
under the full faith and credit clause would not be invalidated unless
it was clearly unreasonable.
The reasonableness standard may not only delineate the powers
delegated to Congress, but it may also be a limitation imposed by the
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.111 Conceivably, the remedies enacted by Congress must be reasonable in the sense that they must
be administratively feasible; they must not burden the state courts with
a procedural rule which is not workable. To illustrate, the federal
statute which prescribes the manner of authenticating nonjudicial public
records has been interpreted to provide for the admission in evidence
of fingerprint records properly certified by the warden of a prison in
a sister state.112 Yet it is questionable whether Congress could compel
state courts to take judicial notice of fingerprint records in other states,
even though the purpose of the statute was to expedite proof, because
judicial notice would not be feasible in that case. In other words, the
due process clause may limit the exercise of power under the full faith
and credit clause to those remedies which are practicable under the circumstances; or the limitation may be implied in the full faith and credit
clause itself. However, the Supreme Court probably would not invalidate a statute for this reason unless a strong case of inconvenience
was shown.
110

See Cook, "The Powers of Congress under the Full Faith and Credit Clause,"
L. J. 421 (1919).
111 The due process clause may impose other limitations as well. See supra, note 94112 State v. Johnson, 194 Wash. 438, 78 P. (2d) 561 (1938). See also: People
v. Reese, 232 App. Div. 624,250 N. Y. S. 392 (1931).
28
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(c) Power of Congress to Adopt Judicial Notice Act
In view of these considerations it is believed that Congress has the
power to adopt an act of the type of the Uniform Act. The effect of
the act would be twofold: (I): By requiring the judge to notice the
foreign law it would expedite proof by dispensing with the necessity
of producing formal evidence of that law. In this respect the statute
would merely prescribe a rule as to the burden of going ahead with the
evidence: the party relying on the foreign law would have the ultimate
burden of proof, the "risk of nonpersuasion," on that issue.113 (2) By
providing that the judge and not the jury shall determine the foreign
law the act would assign to the judge the function of deciding what is
to be proved. In either aspect the statute could be said to declare the
"manner" in which the law of sister states shall be "proved" and "the
effect thereof" in the constitutional sense. Its objectives would coincide
with those of the full faith and credit clause since it would simplify
proof of sister state law, directly facilitating the application of that law.
It would abolish the presumption method of determining the foreign
law, which sometimes has resulted in the application of the "wrong'' "'
substantive rule and would establish procedure for applying the "correct" rule in every case. Congressional adoption of such an act, therefore, would fall within a specifically delegated federal power, and
would not be an invalid encroachment upon the powers of the states
under the Tenth Amendment.
Furthermore, the act would be administratively feasible. We have
already pointed out that a state court can notice the law of other states
as easily as the domestic law and that the early reasons of expediency
for refusing to take judicial notice no longer obtain.114 We have also
noted that the judge is better qualified than the jury to decide questions of foreign law.115 The requirements of the statute, therefore, .
would be reasonable.
The remaining question is whether the statutes and decisions of
sister states are embraced within the "public acts, records and judicial
proceedings," which Congress may require to be judicially noticed.
As we have seen, the framers of the Constitution intended to confer power to accomplish uniformity, certainty and simplicity in the
enforcement of public acts, records and judicial proceedings through
1111

See Shapleigh v. Mier, 299 U. S. 468, 57 S. Ct. 261 (1937).
~4a See supra, p. I 77.
115
See supra, p. 179.
1

1941

J

JumcIAL NoTICE AcT

205

procedural reforms.116 Pursuant to that objective Congress did effect
reforms by providing for the authentication of statutes and official
records which are "public acts" and "records." Congress, then, has
undoubted authority to prescribe the manner of authenticating official statutes and official reports of decisions,111 and it follows that
Congress may designate judicial notice as the method of proof, since
this is merely an alternative means of enforcing "public acts" and
"records." Undoubtedly, in taking judicial notice the judge would
consult commonly-used private publications of decisions and statutes
as well as official publications. But it would be unrealistic to suggest that
Congress may not require judicial notice because such private publications are not "public acts" and "records." Private reports of judicial
opinions are customarily relied upon in arguments of law as correctly representing the opinion rendered and the facts upon which
the decision was based.118 This practice has long been sanctioned by
the judges as a means of establishing the tenor of precedents and
it was undoubtedly known to members of the Constitutional Convention.119 Moreover, privately printed statute books are now frequently accepted as authoritative evidence of the law of a sister
state when they are commonly admitted and used in the courts of
that state.120 The necessity for this practice exists because many of the
116

See supra, pp. 189-191.
Rev. Stat. (1878), § 905, 28 U. S. C. (1934), § 687, provides that state
statutes shall be authenticated by having the seal of the state affixed thereto. Statutes so
authenticated are admissible in evidence. This statute and Rev. Stat. (1878), § 906, 28
U. S. C. (1934), § 688, designate the manner of authenticating judicial records and
nonjudicial public records. Reports of judicial decisions, however, are not ordinarily
proved under these statutes which provide for certified copies of official records, but
under state statutes which state in the alternative two conditions of admissibility: (I) the
report must purport to be printed by authority of the sister state, or (2) it must be
proved to be commonly used in that state as evidence of the law. 6 W1GMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., § 1703 (1940); 5 id., § 1684. See: Whited v. Johnson, (Tex. Civ.
App. 1914) 167 S. W. 812, where the court said that the unpublished opinion of a
court is admissible in evidence as a "record and judicial proceeding," when authenticated as provided by Congress. There is little doubt that Congress has authority to provide that officially printed statute books and reports are admissible in evidence. See suggestion in 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed.,§ 1684, note 13 (1940), that Congress has
the power to enact the Uniform Proof of Statutes Act.
118 6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., § 1703, note 1 (1940); 13 ILL. L. REv.
43 at 57 (1918).
119 6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., § 1703 (1940).
120
This practice obtains under statutes in many states. 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE,
3d ed.,§ 1684, note 15 (1940); 4 JoNES, EVIDENCE, 2d ed.,§ 1724 (1926). In the
absence of such legislation, unofficial volumes purporting to contain the statutes of
foreign states are generally held to be inadmissible. 4 id., § 1723.
111
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compilations of state laws now in current use are privately printed.121
For these reasons "public acts, records and judicial proceedings"
should be construed to mean both official and private reports of decisions and statutes. Since the act would provide that counsel may
assist the judge and would permit the parties to introduce countervailing evidence,122 there is assurance that the courts in taking judicial
notice would consult those books which are customarily regarded as
the most trustworthy evidence of the law.
121
See Field, "Judicial Notice of Public Acts under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause," 12 MINN. L. REv. 439 at 459-460 (1928).
122
See supra, at note 33, and secs. 2 and 4 of the act, quoted in note 1, supra.

